13%左右的货币增速目标或开启债券熊市/Aiming for a monetary growth rate of around 13% may trigger a bear market in bonds.

原创 2016-03-07 季天鹤 央行观察

2016年政府工作报告把广义货币增速定在了13%左右,即2016年底货币存量要较2015年底增加18万亿元。这增幅大概会从哪里来呢?下面将逐项按顺序进行考察。

13%增速的影响因素

首先我们看国外净资产。从2015年6月到2016年1月,国外净资产减少1.5万亿,这里面包含了归还国外债务,也包括了外汇的流出。考虑到上述减少主要发生在2015年下半年汇改之后,我们可以估计在2016年国外净资产会减少2万亿,主要反映了继续还债以及海外配置资产等操作。

然后我们看对政府净债权(对政府债权减去政府存款)。2015年1月底到2016年1月底,银行对政府新增净债权4.6万亿。在2016年,中央财政赤字增加到14000元,比2015年增加2800亿元;地方财政赤字7800亿元,比2015年增加2800亿元。两者合计总共赤字达到2.18万亿。同时,地方专项债券安排了4000亿元。考虑到地方政府会继续发行置换债券,以及前述4.6万亿中包括了0.6万亿政府存款的减少,保守估计2016年银行会继续增加4万亿的对政府债权,如果激进一些可以估计到5万亿。

然后我们看银行对其它金融机构债权。2015年1月末至2016年1月末,银行对其他金融机构债权增加了9万亿,其中2016年1月单月增加3万亿元,这或许反映了1月份非银行金融机构在短期内的流动性需求。此外,2015年这一项目的增长还收到了救市贷款的影响,如果救市贷款在2016年进一步退出,那么这一项目在2016年最终会增长6万亿左右。

银行负债侧主要的看点在于银行债券的发行以及外币存款/外汇汇出。在经历了2015年下半年还债动机引发的人民币存款转变为外币存款汇出还债或境内还债之后,在2016年我们将看到越来越多的买入外汇境内持有或境外持有的操作,全年中银行会有1万亿人民币变为外币存款(单月150亿美元)。

而银行债券在2015年1月至2016年1月间增长3.8万亿,这一数字在2016年应该不会减少,估计仍然在4万亿左右的水平。此外还会有银行资本的增加,2015年1月至2016年1月间增长6500亿,这一增加除了反映银行增资之外,还反映了银行利润导致的资本增加,而银行利润则反映为货币量的减少,即银行的客户减少自己在银行的存款,增加银行的资本。2016年这个增幅大概变化不大。

由上面的情况我们看出,如果想要实现18万亿的M2增幅,按照上述的数字估计,不考虑其他(净)项目的影响,对非金融部门债权要增加16万亿左右。而其他(净)项目在2015年也在不停变大,意味着如果这一现象持续,对非金融部门债权需要增长更多才能保持M2的增速。这意味着16%甚至更高的对非金融部门债权增长率,而且还是在地方政府债务置换之后的。

16万亿甚至更高的对非金融部门债权增速,意味着每个月1万亿以上的贷款和非金融债券购买。如果达不到的话,货币增速恐怕也达不到13%。造成这一结果的主要原因,归根结底还是非银行部门由净售汇变为净购汇(由帮助货币量增长的增项变为减项),以及银行发债被非银行持有造成货币量减少。

债券熊市继续

更多的信贷供给在信贷需求不变的情况下降低利率,但在信贷需求启动的情况下,便只是在满足需求的情况下任凭利率不断走高。更多的货币在购买和按兵不动的选择中,如果选择后者,那么对债券市场并无影响,如果用来购买债券资产,则进入了信贷面临的两种可能中,而如果用来购买其他资产,则是在配置更高收益率资产过程中把利率抬高。

现实的情况是我们将看到两方面的情况。银行在以某个利率放贷和买债同时创造新货币,而银行外的所有部门在用原有货币存量和新创造的货币买卖东西,这里的东西既包括物价指数衡量的商品劳务,也包括外汇和股票等金融资产。目前我们已经看到房地产这种兼具金融资产和实物商品于一身的品种价格开始上行,一线城市已经疯涨,二三线城市止跌开始回升。同时,我们也看到大宗商品这种兼具金融资产和实物商品于一身的品种价格开始稳定甚至上行。

像房价这种由购买引发的价格上行,意味着背后的信贷需求在引领着信贷的供给。目前处于低位的打折房贷利率或许还会稳定一段时间,但当房贷规模增长很快之后,银行也会调整房贷的利率水平。同时,房贷迅速增长本身也意味着降息没有那样必要,这也不符合货币政策逆周期的原则,反而扮演了火上浇油的角色。

而13%的货币增速目标,意味着可以有更多的新增货币不断转化为购买力,而购买导致的价格变化又会引发原有存量货币流动方式的改变。人们会进行各种抵御通胀、抵御本币贬值的操作,包括购房、购入商品、购入外汇等等,而债券则会成为其中最为缺乏魅力的品种,因为现在的债券收益率实在是太低。

如果货币增速目标不是13%,而是10%之类的其他情况,又会如何?在房价起来之前我们还可以从容地讨论这个问题,例如较低的货币增速意味着信贷和不那么低的利率水平,即10年期国债在3%稳住,不过现在,我们已经没有这个讨论的余地了。较低的增速目标意味着信贷供给的不足,利率更会高企,因为信贷的需求已经起来了,人们对收益率的胃口也调高了,更重要的是提供高收益率的资产同时出现了:准备涨起来的房子以及要继续涨下去的房子。

是银行执意以低利率放贷而把利率牵引至靠近银行一边,还是银行追随市场对高利率的追求而抬高自己的放贷利率?在目前的情况下,答案恐怕是简单的,即银行会追随市场的高利率而提高自己的放贷利率,这一方面是银行获取更多收入的方式,同时也是努力覆盖负债成本的无奈手段,因为银行提供的理财产品收益率在那个时候也肯定水涨船高了。更不要忘记,银行还想对冲不良贷款带来的减计损失。

目前尚存两个忧虑,一个是过剩产能的存在能否使得3%通货膨胀无法实现。首先过剩产能虽然很多,但CPI并不仅仅覆盖过剩产能,还包括很多其他因素。比如燃料的价格很大程度上受国外影响,比如农产品价格恐怕也和过剩产能关系不大。如果燃料价格停止下跌,人们手上的钱多了开始进行各种各样的购买,即使过剩行业的过剩依然没有完全缓解,但货币对非过剩产品的购买也足以发动通胀。这当然是一个生产要素重新以更高效的方式配置的好机会。

另一个是在中国比其他国家先通胀的情况下,会不会重现人民币升值资本流入的情况。在之前的文章里我提到,这个问题非常难回答,因为要估计配置外币资产的需求和搞套息交易的需求谁更大,并且还会涉及到很多具体的问题,比如说目前限制资本流出的一些措施等等。不过对于债市而言,等套息交易出现的时候,人民币利率肯定已经上去了,债券熊市早就开演了。

通胀不可能是全盘同步的,毕竟消费品价格也是大家用钱买出来的,钱没有买的东西,价格也就不会有什么变化。完全可能出现通胀已经让很多行业解套了(比如房地产),但其他行业还没有解套。但资金成本则不然,银行并不会特别关注一笔贷款是发放给农业还是工业,对它来说只有利率。

在这个时候,如果央行依然按照政府工作报告的要求压低融资成本,固然可以让没有解套的行业开支减少,比如2015年的资金成本降低让工业企业的财务费用增速明显下降,让地方政府的利息支出也减少许多,效果是很明显的。但如果2016年不少行业已经开始通胀了,银行肯定会考虑多按照高利率贷款给通胀行业,少按照低利率贷款给非通胀行业,于是,我们会看到非通胀行业将面临物价不变但融资成本提高的艰难境地。

In the 2016 government work report, the broad money supply growth rate was set at around 13%. This implies an increase of approximately 18 trillion yuan in the money stock by the end of 2016 compared to the end of 2015. Where might this increase come from? Below, we will examine various factors in sequence.

Factors Influencing the 13% Growth Rate

First, let's look at net foreign assets. From June 2015 to January 2016, net foreign assets decreased by 1.5 trillion yuan. This includes repayment of foreign debt and outflows of foreign exchange. Considering that this decrease mainly occurred in the second half of 2015 after the exchange rate reform, it can be estimated that net foreign assets will decrease by 2 trillion yuan in 2016. This primarily reflects ongoing debt repayment and overseas asset allocation operations.

Next, let's consider net claims on the government (government claims minus government deposits). From the end of January 2015 to the end of January 2016, banks' net claims on the government increased by 4.6 trillion yuan. In 2016, the central government's fiscal deficit increased to 1.4 trillion yuan, an increase of 280 billion yuan from 2015; local government deficits reached 780 billion yuan, up 280 billion yuan from 2015. The total deficit reached 2.18 trillion yuan. Additionally, local government special bonds were allocated 400 billion yuan. Taking into account that local governments will continue to issue replacement bonds and that the aforementioned 4.6 trillion yuan includes a decrease of 60 billion yuan in government deposits, a conservative estimate suggests that banks will increase their claims on the government by 4 trillion yuan in 2016, and a more aggressive estimate might be around 5 trillion yuan.

Moving on, let's look at banks' claims on other financial institutions. From the end of January 2015 to the end of January 2016, banks' claims on other financial institutions increased by 9 trillion yuan, with a monthly increase of 3 trillion yuan in January 2016. This may reflect the short-term liquidity demand of non-bank financial institutions in January. Additionally, the growth of this category in 2015 was influenced by emergency loans. If emergency loans further withdraw in 2016, this category might grow by around 6 trillion yuan in 2016.

Regarding the liability side of banks, a major focus lies in the issuance of bank bonds and foreign currency deposits/foreign exchange outflows. After experiencing the transformation of renminbi deposits into foreign currency deposits for debt repayment or domestic debt repayment in the second half of 2015, in 2016, we will see more operations involving the conversion of renminbi holdings into foreign currency holdings, both domestically and abroad. Throughout the year, around 1 trillion yuan of renminbi could be converted into foreign currency deposits (equivalent to a monthly flow of $15 billion).

The issuance of bank bonds increased by 3.8 trillion yuan from January 2015 to January 2016. This number is unlikely to decrease in 2016 and is estimated to remain at around 4 trillion yuan. Additionally, there will be an increase in bank capital, which grew by 650 billion yuan from January 2015 to January 2016. This increase not only reflects bank capitalization but also results from increased bank profits, which are in turn reflected in the decrease in the money supply. This means that customers reduce their deposits in banks, increasing the bank's capital. This increase in 2016 is likely to remain relatively stable.

Based on the above analysis, in order to achieve an 18 trillion yuan increase in M2, as estimated using the above figures without considering the impact of other (net) items, claims on the non-financial sector need to increase by about 16 trillion yuan. Considering that other (net) items have been increasing steadily in 2015, this implies that a higher growth rate of claims on the non-financial sector is needed to maintain the growth rate of M2. This could potentially require a growth rate of 16% or even higher in claims on the non-financial sector, especially after local government debt replacement.

A growth rate of 16 trillion yuan or even higher in claims on the non-financial sector means more than 1 trillion yuan of loans and non-financial bond purchases every month. If this cannot be achieved, the growth rate of the money supply is unlikely to reach 13%. The main reason for this outcome lies in the fact that the non-banking sector has shifted from being a net seller of foreign exchange to a net buyer (from being a contributor to money supply growth to a detractor), and that bank bond issuance is held by the non-banking sector, leading to a decrease in the money supply.

Continuation of the Bond Bear Market

Increasing credit supply reduces interest rates when credit demand remains unchanged. However, in the case of credit demand being initiated, it results in allowing interest rates to rise while satisfying the demand. When more money is used to purchase assets or remains unused, the choice of the latter has no effect on the bond market. If the former option is chosen, it enters one of the two scenarios faced by credit, and if the money is used to purchase other assets, it raises interest rates during the process of allocating higher-yielding assets.

In reality, we will witness both situations. Banks simultaneously create new money through lending and bond purchases at a certain interest rate, while all sectors outside banks engage in buying and selling goods using existing money supply and newly created money. These transactions encompass goods and services measured by the consumer price index, as well as financial assets such as foreign exchange and stocks. Presently, we are already observing price increases in real estate, a category that serves as both a financial asset and a physical commodity. Property prices have surged in first-tier cities and are beginning to rebound in second and third-tier cities. Similarly, commodity prices, which also represent both financial assets and physical goods, have stabilized or even risen.

Price increases triggered by purchases imply that demand for credit is driving credit supply. Although discounted mortgage rates remain stable for a certain period, if mortgage scale growth accelerates, banks will adjust their mortgage interest rates accordingly. Additionally, the rapid growth of mortgages itself suggests that lower interest rates are less necessary, contradicting the principle of counter-cyclical monetary policy. This role may unintentionally exacerbate the situation.

With a 13% monetary growth target, more new money can be converted into purchasing power, and the resulting price changes will influence the way existing money flows. People will engage in various activities to counter inflation and currency depreciation, including buying real estate, purchasing goods, and acquiring foreign exchange. Bonds, however, will become the least attractive option due to the currently low bond yields.

If the monetary growth target is not 13% but something lower, like 10%, how would it play out? We might have discussed this scenario before housing prices surged, such as discussing the possibility of maintaining a lower growth rate, which could lead to reduced financing costs for industries that have not yet stabilized, like what was observed in 2015 when lower funding costs for industries led to reduced growth in financial expenses for industrial enterprises and local governments. However, with some industries already experiencing inflation in 2016, banks would likely consider lending to inflationary industries at higher interest rates and to non-inflationary industries at lower interest rates. This would place non-inflationary industries in a difficult situation where prices remain unchanged but financing costs increase.